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This article employs cultural political economy to explore, interpret, and 
explain the articulation of competition, competitiveness, and competition 
policies in Asia in the current neoliberal era. It describes how this approach 
explores social order and changes in terms of the interaction between 
semiosis and structuration in the context of four types of selectivity: structural, 
agential, discursive, and technological. It then outlines an analytical 
framework and methodology to apply this approach to the chosen case study. 
This concerns how these modes of selectivity have operated since the 1997 
‘Asian Crisis’ to produce changes in the policy discourses and practices of 
the World Bank and its Asian regional agencies with the declared aim of 
reducing poverty, enhancing competitiveness, and promoting corresponding 
forms of competition policy. Next it examines how these discourses and 
practices are assembling a new dispositive around an emerging disciplinary 
and governmentalized socioeconomic-cum-legal order in the wake of the 
Doha conjuncture in Asia. The concluding remarks address some tensions 
and challenges in the making of this competitiveness order in Asia. 
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This article uses a cultural political economy approach to explore, interpret, and 
explain the articulation of competition, competitiveness, and competition policies in 
Asia in the neoliberal era. It comprises four parts. First, it outlines how this approach 
explores the reproduction and transformation of social order in terms of the 
interaction between semiosis and structuration in the context of four types of 
selectivity: structural, agential, discursive, and technological. This part also outlines 
the analytical framework and methodology deployed in the accompanying case 
study. Second, it examines how the four modes of selectivity have interacted since 
the 1997 ‘Asian Crisis’ to produce changes in the policy discourses and practices of 
the World Bank and its Asian regional agencies with the declared aim of reducing 
poverty, enhancing competitiveness, and promoting corresponding forms of 
competition policy. Third, it investigates how a new dispositive is being assembled 
through these discourses and practices around an emerging disciplinary and 
governmentalized socioeconomic-cum-legal order in the wake of the post-Doha 
conjuncture in Asia. Fourth, some concluding remarks identify some tensions and 
challenges in the making of this competitiveness order in Asia. 
 
2. Cultural political economy 
 
Cultural political economy (hereafter CPE) is a broad theoretical current that 
integrates the ‘cultural turn’ (i.e., a concern with discourse and inter-subjective 
meaning-making) with critical political economy (for an extended discussion, see 
Sum and Jessop 2013). It differs from the post-Marxist discourse analysis and 
constructivist approaches, which tend to focus one-sidedly on the constructive, 
performative role of ideas and discourses and to neglect the specific features and 
dynamic of the capitalist order. Whereas post-Marxist discourse analysis (e.g., 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985) follows de Saussure in highlighting the arbitrary, 
conventional relationship between signifier and signified, the CPE approach also 
explores actual or potential referents of signification in the real world1 (Sum and 
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Jessop 2013: 164-8, 178-80). It argues that discourse involves more than an 
arbitrary play of signifiers confined to a linguistic or symbolic realm because the 
selection, retention, and institutionalization of discourses depends in part on 
structural, technological, and agential selectivities and the potential for social 
transformation in the ‘extra-discursive’ realm. This interest in the relation between 
the semiotic and extra-semiotic also distinguishes CPE from constructivist 
approaches (e.g., Blyth 2002). For, paraphrasing Orwell, while all construals are 
equal as significations, they are not equally performative. Only some construals get 
selected and retained as the basis for constituting, institutionalizing, and reproducing 
social relations and this depends, as noted, on all four kinds of selectivities. 
 
On Marx, Gramsci and Foucault 
 
One way to explore the interface between the semiotic and extra-semiotic is to stage 
an encounter between Marx, Gramsci and Foucault (Sum and Jessop 2013: 203-14). 
While Marx provides the crucial foundations for the critique of political economy, 
Gramsci developed a ‘vernacular materialism’ (Ives 2004) that highlights the role of 
language in sense- and meaning-making in mediating hegemony and domination 
across all spheres of society (Gramsci 1971; see also Thomas 2009; Green 2011). 
CPE enhances this synthesis by integrating Foucault’s insights on objectivation, 
subjectivation, power/knowledge, and their associated technologies of power. He 
notes that technology has a Greek root (techné) that relates to arts, crafts, gadgets, 
knowledge, skills, and tactics (Rooney 1997). Thus, for Foucault, technologies, 
considered as arts of governing, have the potential to constitute objects, create 
subject positions and recruit subjects, and, in particular, create power/knowledge 
relations and thereby facilitate disciplinary and governmental power (Foucault 1991 
and 1995). Combining the concepts, insights, and explanatory principles of these 
three radical theorists and activists can generate a productive heuristic for exploring 
the role of discourses and articulation as dispositives (see below) in the 
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Source: Sum and Jessop 2013: 206. 
 
This three-sided encounter involves a triple movement that helps to resolve the 
paradox identified in Marsden’s aphorism: Marx tells us why, but cannot tell us how, 
and Foucault tells us how, but cannot tell us why (Marsden 1999: 135). First, 
Gramsci’s vernacular materialism and strategic focus renew the Marxian critique of 
political economy with categories (e.g., hegemony) to analysis how as well as why. 
Second, this renewed Marxism provides the categories to reconnect Foucault’s 
analyses to critical political economy. Third, Foucault enables the 
governmentalization of Gramsci through his interest in technologies of power as well 
as objectivation and subjectivation (see Figure 1; for further discussion, see Sum 
and Jessop 2013: 205-214). This subsection now presents two of the topics at stake 
in this encounter.  
 
The first concerns certain parallels (and tensions) between Gramsci’s account of the 
creative and performative role of hegemony in constituting power relations and 









Hegemony problematizes the relationship between particular and universal interests 
in positing, promoting and sustaining a collective will (e.g., the ‘national-popular’ 
interest) through political, intellectual and moral leadership backed by a judicious mix 
of symbolic and material concessions and protected by the armour of coercion. 
Likewise, truth regime problematizes the ‘truth effects’ created and instituted through 
discourses, social practices, and what one might refer to as ‘knowledging 
technologies’. Truth regimes produce object fields, subject positions and forms of 
power/knowledge that enable the assembling of dispositives. For Foucault, 
dispositive is a ‘decidedly heterogeneous ensemble’ that includes elements such as 
‘discourses, institutions, architectural structures, prescriptive decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral or philanthropic 
propositions, in short: words, but also what is not expressed in words’ (Foucault 
1980: 194). These arguments have been developed by the Duisburg School of 
discourse analysis, which is inspired by Foucault’s work on discourse and dispositive 
and the role of power/knowledge relations to construct truth regimes and consolidate 
power relations in specific apparatuses (dispositives) (see Link 1983; Jäger and 
Maier 2009; Caborn 2007). In the spirit of Gramsci and Foucault, this school argues 
that the mutual constitution of discourse and dispositive tends to sediment systems 
of power and/or rule and that the ‘grammar’ of the hegemonic or dominant 
discourses also limits alternatives and the capacities to resist hegemony and 
domination. 
 
A second aspect concerns the constraints on constituting objects of governmentality 
through the co-construction of discourses and dispositives. Strategic interventions 
cannot be reconfigured at will or be actualized according to a pregiven plan. Indeed, 
they routinely produce uneven, unintended and even contradictory effects because 
of the recalcitrance of the raw materials that they seek to govern, the plurality of rival 
projects concerned to transform and govern these materials, and the resistance that 
such projects generate. Foucault (1991, 2008a, 2008b) recognized these issues in 
his lectures on governmentality and statecraft (see also Jessop 2010). Revisiting 
Marx (especially through a Gramscian optic) helps to identify the roots of these 
obstacles in the contradictions, crisis-tendencies and antagonisms of capitalist social 
formations that render them recalcitrant as ‘objects’ of governance and provide the 
motives and capacities for its ‘subjects’ to resist. This is important for the ensuing 
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analysis because of Marx’s ground-breaking contributions to the analysis of 
competition and its various modalities and scales in the contradictory and conflictual 
dynamic of differential accumulation. 
 
Consistent with this encounter, CPE identifies four general modes of selectivity: 
structural, discursive, technological, and agential selectivities (see Sum and Jessop 
2013: 214-29 and below). Focusing on these provides one analytical entry point to 
specific case studies of struggles over hegemony, especially as the relative weight of 
these selectivities varies over time and in different conjunctures. Indeed, it is their 
interaction that conditions the variation, selection, and retention of hegemonic, sub-
hegemonic, and counterhegemonic projects and their societal repercussions and 
contradictions. . Nonetheless, whatever the research problem and the chosen entry-
point, attention should turn sooner or later to their contingent coevolution and how 
these selectivities may become crystallized into specific ‘discourse-dispositive’ 
assemblages. I now elaborate some key concepts in this regard. 
 
Four modes of selectivity in social relations 
 
The CPE approach distinguishes four kinds of selectivity that enable variation, shape 
selection processes, and influence retention (see Table 1).  
 
Structural selectivity denotes the asymmetrical configuration of structural constraints 
and opportunities on social forces as they pursue particular projects. This 
configuration exists only insofar as it is reproduced in and through social practices 
and can be transformed through time, through cumulative molecular changes and/or 
more deliberate attempts to transform the pattern of constraints and opportunities. 
Whether these attempts succeed or not, they are likely to have path-dependent 
legacies. 
 
Discursive selectivity is also asymmetrical.  It comprises the asymmetrical 
constraints and opportunities inscribed in particular genres, styles, and discourses 
(or, more generally, particular forms of discourse) in terms of what can be 
enunciated, who is authorized to enunciate, and how enunciations enter intertextual, 
interdiscursive, and contextual fields. Semiotic resources set limits to what can be 
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imagined, whether in terms of ‘objects’, possible statements within a discursive 
formation, themes that can be articulated within a given semantic field, or subject 
positions that can be adopted. Critical discourse analysis provides important 
analytical tools for studying these issues (e.g., Andersen 2003; Fairclough 2003). 
Furthermore, different forms of discourse and/or genres position subjects and agents 
in specific situations. A related set of selectivities concerns the extent and grounds 
that make some discursive forms more or less accessible to some agents rather than 
others either because of their sense- and meaning-making competence and their 
discursive competence  in relation to everyday interactions or the demands of 
socialization into specialized discourses (e.g., neoclassical economics, law, and 
statistics). Foucauldian discourse analysis has much to offer here in terms of 
conceptual architectures and semantic fields. 
 
Table 1 Four Modes of Selectivity 
 




of basic social forms 
(e.g., capital relation, 
nature-society relations), 
their instantiation in 
institutional orders and 
organizational forms, and 
in specific interaction 
contexts 
Structures are not absolute constraints on 
all actors equally but necessarily favour 
some interests, identities, agents, spatio-
temporal horizons, strategies, and tactics 
over others. 





Semiosis as a process of 
selective sense- and 
meaning-making required 
so that agents can ‘go 
on’ in the face of 
complexity. 
 
Operates at all scales 
from the micropores of 
everyday life to societal 
self-descriptions. 
Sense- and meaning-making shape 
perception and social communication. 
 
Discursively-inscribed selectivities frame 
and limit possible imaginaries, genre 
chains, arguments, subjectivities, social 
and personal identities, and the scope for 
hegemony, sub- and counter-hegemonies. 
 
Technological  
Technical and social 
forces and relations in 
and of production 
These technologies condition the 
appropriation and transformation of nature, 





technologies linked to 
specific mechanisms and 
sites of intervention tied 
to power/knowledge 
relations  
dynamics in different fields in the social 
and spatio-temporal division of labour 
These technologies produce objects and 
subjects, shape anatomo- and bio-politics, 
create truth regimes, divide and coordinate 




Specific capacities of 
specific (sets of )social 
agents to ‘make a 
difference’ in particular 
conjunctures thanks to 
idiosyncratic abilities to 
exploit the three other 
kinds of selectivity 
Making a difference depends on abilities to 
(1) read conjunctures and identify the 
scope for action; (2) re-activate and re-
articulate sedimented discourses; (3) remix 
extant social technologies or invent new 
ones; (4) deploy strategies and tactics to 
shift the balance of forces in space-time. 
 
Source: Abridged version of Table 5.1 (Sum and Jessop 2013: 218-9). 
 
Technological selectivities have two referents in CPE. In broad terms, they include 
the full range of forces of production and technical and social relations of production 
involved in the social division of labour. Marx and Gramsci have much to contribute 
to the analysis and critique of their selectivities and, as we shall see, they are crucial 
to understanding the nature of economic and societal competitiveness. Foucault, 
while not neglectful of this set of referents, is more interested in: (1) the micro-
technologies of power involved in constituting objects and creating subject and inter-
subject positions; and (2) the technologies of disciplinary and governmental power 
and their relation to truth regimes – in regard to which one might call them 
‘knowledging technologies’. These are important aspects of his more general 
analysis of the discourse-dispositive nexus and the limits that this nexus sets to 
imagining radical alternatives and implementing transformative projects (see below). 
 
Agential selectivity refers to the differential capacity of individual agents or specific 
social forces with specific identities and interests to interpret and act upon the 
asymmetrical constraints and opportunities entailed in the three other kinds of 
selectivity. Social actors can make a difference thanks to their relative capacities 
read particular conjunctures, articulate or re-articulate social imaginaries and 
translate them into discourses and feasible projects, deploy old or new technologies 
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of power, and engage in wars of position and/or manoeuvre (see also Table 4, which 
applies some of these categories to interpret and illustrate a particular case study). 
 
3. A CPE of competiveness, competition and competition policy: the making of 
a pro-poor neoliberal regime in Asia 
 
I now apply selected categories and arguments to examine the micro-construction of 
a new hegemonic project for the Asian region (defined below) that was articulated 
around competitiveness and competition in response to the failure of the Doha 
Round when a coalition of developing countries managed to block further global 
neoliberal market reforms. This prompted organic intellectuals to search for 
alternative strategies to achieve similar objectives on a macro-regional scale by 
exploiting the prevailing structural, discursive, and technological selectivities in this 
conjuncture to make a difference through a skilful articulation of micro-level and 
meso-level practices to extend and consolidate neoliberal hegemony. 
Methodologically, CPE draws on the critical political economy literature on neoliberal 
restructuring (e.g., Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnson 2004; Plehwe and Walpen 
2006) and critical discourse analysis (especially the Duisburg School, e.g., Link 1983 
and Jäger and Maier 2009). The remainder of this article illustrates the CPE 
approach in terms of agential, discursive and technological selectivities. In particular, 
it examines the role of organic intellectuals in extending and applying fields of 
knowledge such as ‘new institutional economics’; and it also explores the 
objectivation of competition and competitiveness and the construction of a new 
intersubjective space based on competitive-useful subjects (subjectivation) ties to 
specific technologies of power and knowledge. To illustrate what is at stake here, it 
draws on a range of texts such as policy speeches, policy documents, outlooks, 
policy toolkits, etc. related to competitiveness and competition policy. These 
discursive instruments have their own discursive and technological selectivities that 
emerge at particular conjuncture when nodal agencies such as major economists 
playing particular roles. 
 




During the protracted Doha Round organized by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), developed countries and multinational corporations sought to deepen the 
neoliberalization of the global economy. They encountered strong resistance from 
developing countries supported by NGOs on the grounds that market opening would 
allow large transnational corporations to gain a bigger market share in their 
economies without securing reciprocal advantages in developed economies (Altay 
2011: 117 and 159-60). In Asia, this might threaten national industrial champions 
and undermine their exportist modes of accumulation (Jessop and Sum 2006: 152-
186). In the trade negotiations at the Cancún Ministerial Meeting in September 2003, 
faced with this resistance, the WTO withdrew its proposals for a global competition 
policy regime. Indeed, in its subsequent ‘July 2004 package’, which was formally 
adopted on 1 August 2004, the WTO General Council announced that competition 
policy issues would be excluded from the WTO Work Programme for the Doha 
Round. 
 
This tactical retreat, which did not end the WTO’s support for a global competition 
policy regime, occurred at the critical juncture of the transition from Washington to 
post-Washington Consensus. As the dominant global economic paradigm between 
1980 and 1997, the Washington Consensus promoted an unregulated, liberalized 
and privatized space potentially embracing the world market and with the potential 
for capital to colonize world society. The trade and financial liberalization and 
associated policies proposed by the IMF, WTO and World Bank for developing 
countries generated both blowback and backlash. In Asia, they stimulated financial 
speculation, a boom in real estate, and economic and social polarization. They also 
created the conditions for the 1997 Asian crisis with its debt crisis, structural 
economic crisis, and mass unemployment – which provided the excuse and rationale 
for more vigorous imposition of IMF conditionalities such as fiscal austerity, 
neoliberal structural reforms, and privatization (Beeson and Robison 2000: 3-24). 
Accordingly the Bretton Woods institutions were subject to criticisms and protests 
from Asian states and their business allies and, more vociferously, from local and 
transnational NGO networks. 
 
Unsurprisingly, this made Asian political and social forces extra-defensive about the 
extension of neoliberalism envisaged in the Doha Round. Thus global and regional 
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actors searched for more palatable (but still neoliberal) development imaginaries and 
for new policy discourses and institutions that could secure them. They began to 
explore new theoretical/policy orientations, institutional entry-points and new sites 
and scales of action that would recast and deepen the neoliberal thinking. This 
search process culminated in the so-called post-Washington Consensus. Important 
elements of this new approach were reworked discourses and related practices such 
as competitiveness, poverty reduction, pro-poor, knowledge-sharing, good 
governance competition, etc. (cf. St Clair 2006). These shifted the focus of neoliberal 
policy formulation and implementation from the Doha Round, especially following the 
forced retreat in 2004, to other sites and scales of action. These included other 
international organizations (notably the World Bank, UNCTAD, and OECD), 
worldwide networks (such as the US-sponsored International Competition Network) 
and regional organizations (including the EU and the Asian Development Bank). In 
particular, the World Bank and its regional counterparts became major forums for 
promoting competition policies. Discursively, especially after the Asian crisis, the 
World Bank was experimenting with a new economic language and practices that, it 
claimed, could remedy market failures. For example, addressing the World Bank 
Board of Governors after the crisis, the then World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn claimed: 
 
Too often we have been too narrow in our conception of the economic 
transformations that are required – while focusing on macroeconomic 
numbers, or on major reforms like privatization, we ignored the basic 
institutional infrastructure, without which a market economy simply cannot 
function (Wolfensohn 1998: 11-12) 
 
This discursive shift from the market-oriented Washington Consensus was supported 
and grounded in the ‘new institutional economics’, which emphasized ‘getting 
institutions right’. Thus institutions such as property rights, contract legislations and 
belief systems are seen to affect economic performances as they bring security and 
reduce uncertainty with economic transactions (e.g., North 1990). This institutional 
turn was also endorsed by the newly appointed chief economist of the World Bank, 
Joseph Stiglitz, who called for institutions and states to complement market forces 
by: (1) developing regulatory frameworks (e.g., anti-trust law) for market competition 
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(see case study below); (2) reinvigorating institutions to build administrative and 
technical capability; (3) instituting rules and norms that incentivize officials to act in 
the collective interest; and (4) creating partnerships between states, private sectors 
and civil society actors, etc. (Stiglitz 1989; Stiglitz with Chang 2001: 40-5). The 
institutional turn and its associated discursive shifts mediated the transition from the 
free market-oriented Washington Consensus towards the post-Washington 
Consensus and its neoliberal governance agenda (see below). While this agenda 
was pursued at many sites, this article will now concentrate on its promulgation and 
instantiation in Asia, which is defined, for present purposes, as the economies that 
fall under the remit of the Asian Development Bank. 
 
Agential and discursive selectivities of the World Bank/Asian Development 
Bank (ADB): ‘Knowledge Bank’ and knowledge brand 
 
In parallel with the reinvention of the neoliberal discourse at the global scale of the 
World Bank, there were efforts to translate it at the macro-regional, national and 
subnational scales through more or less skilful exploitation of agential, discursive 
and technological selectivities. Key roles in this regard were played by 
global/regional organizations, development agencies, policy commissions, policy 
advisors, business leaders, chambers of commerce, management consultants, 
competition professionals, trainers, etc. These diverse agents operate within the 
global-regional circuits of policy knowledge and aim to satisfy the demand for fast 
policy (see Peck and Theodore 2015). Apart from the policy discourses on ‘getting 
institutions right’, other narratives in global policy circuits included: (1) ‘getting 
knowledge management right’ (e.g., Wenger 1999) based on sharing information 
and enhancing the capacities of relevant communities of actors; and (2) ‘getting 
competitiveness right’ (e.g., Porter 1990 and, Lundvall 1992) with a view to 
promoting growth and development, These narratives have been selectively 
combined to rebuild neoliberal hegemony at the  World Bank and its regional 
counterparts such as the Asian Development Bank. 
 




Key players in the World Bank and ADB have pursued a new knowledge 
management strategy since 1996. This allowed them to reorient and redefine their 
identity from a traditional lending institution to ‘The Knowledge Bank’. It mobilized 
stakeholders (e.g., governments, private sectors, NGOs; foundations and judicial 
bodies) to co-produce development ideas/advice for subsequent dissemination to 
developing countries. This rebranding has strengthened their image as experts in 
constructing and transmitting development knowledge (Murphy 2007: 77). From a 
CPE viewpoint, there are two key questions about these attempts to remake 
neoliberal hegemony: what development knowledge is being selectively 
constructed/transmitted; and what is being (de-)valued by the Banks? To answer 
these questions, we need to consider the agential, discursive, and technological 
selectivities of the World Bank and ADB. 
 
First, knowledge about ‘getting institutions right’ (see above) was a key element in 
the two banks’ agential and discursive selectivities. In agential terms, the 
appointments of James Wolfensohn as the new President in 1995 (until 2005) and of 
Joseph Stiglitz as the Chief Economist from 1997 (until 2000) enabled these organic 
intellectuals to reorient and renegotiate the Bank’s knowledge base away from 
neoclassical economics. Not without their critics, the two leaders with the support of 
teams of academic-consultants (Wade 2001: 129-130) rolled out their version of 
‘new institutional economics’ under the Bank’s poverty-reduction-growth policy 
framework. This included the development of good governance, getting regulatory 
and institutional fundamentals right, building public services and infrastructure, etc. 
(Cammack 2003: 10; Taylor and Soederberg 2007: 455).  This discursive imprint can 
be discerned in several World Bank knowledge products (e.g., development reports 
and programmes) between 1997 and 2005. Together they constructed a new (inter-
)discursive space that gave a new sense and meaning to ‘development’. Starting 
from the World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World and 
moving through several reports to the 2005 publication, A Better Investment Climate 
for Everyone, ideas such as the need for ‘capable states’ to support markets formed 
the basis for the subsequent discursive articulation and interweaving  with pro-poor 
growth rhetoric, narratives, policies and programmes (see Table 2). More 
specifically, ‘capable states’ are narrated as agents that support and complement 
market forces, especially in creating the right regulatory environment for private 
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sector competition. The role of state institutions in this regard include developing 
competition policy/law, antitrust legislation, good governance judicial development, 
etc., are valued as they are said to be able to mitigate market distortion, improve 
investment climate and create jobs and reduce poverty (World Bank 2005: 95-106).  
 
The selective integration of ‘private sector competition’ into a poverty reduction 
agenda by the World Bank can be examined on two levels. First, the neoliberal 
narrative about ‘market distortion’ that required rigorous competition policy/law to 
counteract domestic monopoly conditions (e.g., cartels, price-setting activities, etc.) 
was retained in the name of promoting private sector competition. Second, drawing 
on ‘new institutional economics’, this neoclassical version was rearticulated to 
emphasize the importance of ‘getting institutions right’ as an integral part of 
development policy. It is ineffective institutions (e.g., corruption, rigidity, information 
problems) that are now said to prevent or hinder the poor from engaging effectively 
with the market. In other words, this modified competition gaze combined the old 
market ‘distortion’ view of neoclassical economic with the new ‘states complement 
markets’ perspective of ‘new institutional economics’. It is by balancing ‘markets’ and 
‘governance’ that a ‘good institutional fit’ can be achieved that, in turn, is expected to 
reduce ‘barriers to competition’ via competition law and competition policy. In short, 
this genre chain2 both selectively expands and limits development imagination. It 
expands development in a pro-poor and participatory direction; but it also selectively 
limits it to the neoliberal rhetoric and practices of ‘market distortion’, ‘private sector 
competition’ and intervention via the development of competition policy and law and 
related measures. This new round of knowledge on structural adjustment reasserts 
neoliberal control by seeing competition not as a natural process but as a 
development tool that needs to be institutionalized and produced by getting the 
‘competition policy and competition law right’. In this regard, the agential and 
discursive selectivities favoured technical and juridical means to make the post-
Washington Consensus. 
 
Table 2 Examples of the Global-Regional Knowledge Products Conducive to 












Examples of Knowledge Products Related to 
Pro-Poor Growth, Competitiveness and 
Competition Policy/Law  
Global World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 





Asian Development Outlook 2003 
Competition Law Policy Roundtable 2006 
Competition Law Toolkit 2006 
AEGC Workshops 2008-2010 
  
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
ADB discursive thickenings: ‘Knowledge Bank’ appropriating knowledge brand 
 
These discursive changes on the global level were translated to the regional scale. 
For example, the ADB echoed the World Bank’s identity as a ‘knowledge bank’ and 
its new institutional approach to competition law and policy. Indeed, to increase the 
reverberation of the World Bank’s new discourse in the region, the ADB added 
another discursive layer to the construction. It thickened it by linking competition, 
competition law and policy to the idea of ‘competitiveness’. Discourses on 
‘competitiveness’ are widely circulated in and across global, regional, national and 
subnational policy circuits. I have argued elsewhere that these discourses are 
condensed into ‘knowledge brands’ (Sum 2009). A knowledge brand is a set of 
hegemonic meaning-making discourses and linked dispositives promoted by ‘world-
class’ guru-academic-consultants (e.g., Michael Porter, Harvard Business School, 
Bain, and Boston Consulting Group) who claim unique knowledge of, and insight 
into, the economic world and its wider social context. It is readily translatable and 
combinable with other brands and can be turned into pragmatic policy recipes and 
toolkits (e.g., indexes, outlooks, guidelines, best practices). It identifies potentials for 
change and appeals to the pride and anxieties of subjects experiencing socio-
economic change during periods of uncertainty. 
 
One of the most significant brands in this regard is Michael Porter’s approach. This is 
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reflected in a policy toolkit sponsored by the World Economic Forum, namely, the 
Global Competitiveness Index of ranking and benchmarking countries (Sum 2009; 
see also Kantola 2006; Davis et al., 2012). This has a distinctive technological 
selectivity based on technologies of hierarchization, performance and judgement. It 
grades countries in terms of their economic performance and renders the world 
knowable through the rank ordering of countries. In neo-Foucauldian terms this 
involves a neoliberal disciplinary technology that operates as a ‘paper panopticon’ to 
visibilize countries and problematize policy areas. It normalizes a competitiveness 
truth regime and legitimates power to intervene and regulate lives in a market-
friendly direction. Such disciplinary toolkits and their status as a global knowledge 
brand have met strong resonance in Asia. The competitiveness toolkit is used to 
reveal the strengths/weakness of countries and it has been recontextualized in policy 
documents as ‘catch up competitiveness’ – a panacea for further development in the 
region (e.g., the ADB’s Asian Development Outlook 2003). 
 
Following the failure to roll out global competition law through the WTO, the ADB 
acted to selectively hybridize and thicken the competitiveness ‘knowledge brand’ by 
promoting the conditions for more effective competition. The mantra of ‘Competition 
for Competitiveness’ (meaning domestic competition for international 
competitiveness) is discernible in the policy documents of the ADB and ADBI (Asian 
Development Bank Institute). In the Report and Proceedings of the ADB’s 
Competition Law and Policy Roundtable meeting on the 16 and 17 May in 2006 in 
New Delhi (see table 2), ‘competition’ and ‘competitiveness’ were used as the title of 
both the Preface and of the IMD Index, illustrating the importance (and the power) of 
‘competitiveness’ in disciplinary-classificatory-hierarchical terms (Sum 2009). Within 
this report, one contributor, Dr V. Krishnamurthy (Chair of India’s National 
Manufacturing Competitiveness Council) was quoted as saying that ‘[c]ompetition 
laws trigger competitiveness; they provide the framework necessary to achieving 
competitiveness’ (ADB 2006). He continued: ‘competition laws provide the necessary 
framework for competitiveness as “final effects”’ (ADB 2006: 8). Such narratives  
introduces a means-ends relation to competition law with a view to giving ‘hope’ to 
countries and regions that there is a clear and almost fool-proof path for them to 




Technological selectivity of ‘Competition for Competitiveness’: toolkits and 
workshops 
 
This means-end relation between competition (law) and ‘competitiveness’ underpins 
a functional-cum-pragmatic reasoning that supports regional strategizing and 
planning. The same document reported that Allan Fels, Dean of the Australia and 
New Zealand School of Government, highlighted the importance of a ‘Competition 
Policy Strategy Model’ in claiming ‘that regulatory institutions as well as the judiciary 
need capacity building and international “technical assistance” can play an important 
role in this regard’ (ADB 2006: xv). These twin emphases on ‘capacity building’ and 
‘technical assistance’ mark the influence of new managerial knowledge on pro-poor 
competition law and policy is implemented at the level of everyday institutional 
practices. Some insights into what is at stake here can be drawn from Craig and 
Porter’s examination of World Bank project implementation in Vietnam, Uganda, 
Pakistan, and New Zealand (Craig and Porter 2006). They argued that ‘new 
institutional economics’ visibilizes the institutional gaps and can provide technical-
managerial tools for intervention and, in the cases that they examined, this produced 
a three-pronged plan for intervention encapsulated in the slogan: ‘Inform, Enforce, 
Compete’ (Craig and Porter 2006: 102). Considering these elements in turn indicates 
how implementing this policy framework in the Asian region serves to intensify 
disciplinary and governmentalizing power and its effects. 
 
First, ‘inform’ refers to the way the ADB provides information about competition law -- 
in the form of an on-line ‘toolkit’. Introduced in 2006, the “Competition Law Toolkit” 
(ADB  2007; Figure 2), is part of the ADB’s regional legal-managerial technologies 
that are designed to realize the objectives. This toolkit has many elements. By way 
of illustration, let us consider its ‘Overview of Practices Controlled by Competition 
Law’ (ADB Website 2007). This reveals a shift in rhetoric from an emphasis on 
‘competition-competitiveness’ to a rational-economic focus on what is simply 
‘beneficial’ or ‘harmful’ to the competition process (see Table 2 above). By identifying 
‘harm/benefit’ intensifies, this knowledging technology governmentalizes power by 
providing a form of easily applied, diagnostic knowledge that provides an easy 
assessment grid that distinguishes between good and bad competition practices; 
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brings regional-national actors into the competition-law fold; and guides formative 






Figure 2: Asian Development Bank’s Competition Law Toolkit 
 
(Source: ADB website http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/OGC-
Toolkits/Competition-Law/default.asp), last accessed 10 May 2014 
 
In addition, the toolkit provides programmes for technical assistance and specifies 
the appropriate enforcement mechanisms, which include independent competition 
authorities, the role of courts and ‘administrative guidance’, etc. This way of mapping 
the legal-managerial organizations, technical assistance and procedures subject 
regional and national actors to formalist-disciplinary designs of competition law. 
 
Table 3: Overview of Competition Law Practices: Harms, Benefits  
and Recommendations 
 
Practices Harms Benefits Recommended 
Actions 
















(e.g., monopoly or 
dominant firm) 
Predatory pricing 











Reduce rivalry of 



























(Source: Author’s compilation from the ADB website on Competition Law Toolkit 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/OGC-Toolkits/Competition-
Law/complaw020000.asp) last accessed 10 May 2014 
 
Second, the ‘enforce’ part of Craig and Porter’s framework is evident in the selective 
deployment of managerial practices that build institutions and strengthen the 
technical expertise of law providers. An example is the training workshops organized 
by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) (the executive arm of the ADB) 
together with the US Federal Trade Commission (USFTC), OECD, and the ASEAN 
Secretariat. Their third AEGC [ASEAN Expert Group on Competition] Workshop on 
‘Costs and Benefits of Competition Policy, Law and Regulatory Bodies’ in Kuala 
Lumpur on 18-19 May 2009 was ‘part of the capacity building program to assist 
ASEAN countries to develop and harmonize competition laws and policies by 2015’ 













Figure 3: The 3rd AEGC Workshop on Competition Law/Policy 2009 
 
(Source: ADBI Website, http://www.adbi.org/event/3070.3rd.aegc.workshop/ 
Last accessed 10 May 2014) 
 
Training workshops to build ‘competition/competitiveness’ institutions and best 
practices serve to normalize competition law/policy as well as to construct and 
manage communities of legal stakeholders. Each workshop comprised ‘about 30 
mid-senior government officials and representatives of competition and related 
agencies in ASEAN member countries and the ASEAN Secretariat’ (ADBI 2009). 
They were encouraged to adopt ‘best practices’ to assess the regulatory impact of 
competition laws and policy. ‘Best practices’ were codified in cost-benefit terms; and 
target groups were encouraged to become learning subjects who should overcome 
their lack of competition-competitive know-how. These cost-benefit modes of 
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calculation contributed towards the shaping of ‘choices’ and elicited particular modes 
of support and advocacy for competitive practices based on cases. 
 
In neo-Foucauldian terms, the technological selectivity of such toolkits and 
workshops can be interpreted as ‘apparatuses of rule’. They involve micro-
technologies of steering, assessment and capacitation that target and ‘assist’ states, 
firms, mid-ranking officials, and delegates of related agencies, who are steered 
towards accepting and promoting a competitiveness order based on market-
competition calculations. These targets are encouraged to learn and adopt skill-
based toolkits and best practices with regards to regulatory design, advocacy and 
assessment. These micro-technologies guide and influence their conduct in line with 
the neo-liberal visions of competitive usefulness among ‘experts’ on competition law 
and policy. These intensify the mode of ruling over everyday policy life and are 
designed to ‘change hearts and minds of actors and stakeholders in policy, plan and 
programme procedures’ (Marshall and Fisher 2006: 284; cf. Cammack 2014) but this 
does not occur without contradictory consciousness, tensions, and contestations. 
 
Third, the ‘compete’ part of Craig and Porter’s framework refers in the Asian case to 
the promotion of market forces and market-friendly mentalities via the integration of 
pro-competition rules into understandings of good governance in general and norms 
of corporate governance in particular. The intention behind this agenda is that this 
mode of ‘governing at a distance’ will limit the scope for cronyism, corruption, and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies, both through the institution of ‘new rules of the game’ and 
through internalization and self-regulation. By generalizing rules, norms, and 
practices of good corporate governance, it is narrated that competition will be 
fostered, opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour reduced, and reciprocal monitoring 
and self-monitoring encouraged. This technology of competition-competitiveness is 
extended beyond a commitment to the rule of law in a narrow juridico-political sense 
to include the creation of individual and corporate subjects who value a level-playing 
field, especially when it comes to the procurement and delivery of public services. 
Where successful, these governing technologies help to intensify the penetration of 
norms of competition-competitiveness into the everyday life of the region. Of 
particular importance is the penetration of these norms into the micro-pores of 
22 
 
society, introducing the ideology of competitiveness into local economies that are 





4. The contingent dispositivization of a disciplinary and governmentalized 
socioeconomic-legal (dis-)order 
 
The interaction among these modes of selectivity serves to regularize and sediment 
competition-competitiveness subjectivities that are performed, repeated and stabilize 
over time. As forms of discourses, knowledging apparatuses, genre chains, 
knowledging technologies and strategic logics (see Table 4), they become 
regularized through administrative strategies and judicial institutions. Such 
dispositivization of competitiveness, competition and competition law is understood 
in terms of how they are selected, assembled and consolidated in Asia after the 
Doha Round. Participating stakeholder subjects are disciplined (via index) and 
governmentalized (via technologies of capacitation and [self-]rule) to become a part 
of the competitive-competition socioeconomic-legal (dis-)order. 
 
Table 4 Structural Contexts and Modes of Selectivity in the Making of the 
Competitiveness-Competition Socioeconomic-Legal (Dis-) Order 
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Failure of Doha to 
include competition 
policy in its trade 
negotiation 2004 
 
 Beyond Doha 
and the WTO 


















poor growth and 
competition 

































(Source: Author’s compilation) 
 
In Asia, the gains of this contingent dispositivization of this new socioeconomic-legal 
(dis-)order on competitiveness and competition are unevenly distributed. It has 
benefitted some social forces (e.g., transnational investors, academic/professional 
brokers/ practitioners, etc.) more than others (e.g., domestic state-owned capital). 
Thus its implementation faces resistance from domestic business capital especially 
those that are tied to state-dominated mode of growth (e.g., chaebols in South Korea 
and government-owned companies in Singapore) and the real estate sector. 
Ultimately, competition law remains a site of negotiation and contestation. Particular 
sectors or state-owned companies negotiated their ‘exemption’ statuses and 
resistance groups negotiate the meanings of the social and/or contestation via the 
social (e.g., the call for pro-poor redistribution and not pro-poor growth). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This article employed CPE to interpret and explain competition, competitiveness and 
competition law/policy. Theoretically, CPE steers a course between one-sided 
constructivist cultural turns and more structuralist analyses of economic categories 
and system dynamics. This course is guided by the co-evolution of (1) sense- and 
meaning-making and (2) the contingent structuration of social relations. This co-
evolution is also shaped by technological and agential selectivities.  This general 
approach builds on a virtual dialogue among Marx, Gramsci and Foucault in which 
each contributes key ideas and also provides fruitful qualifications to the arguments 
and insights of the other. 
 
Empirically, CPE has been applied to examine how the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank extend neoliberal hegemony in the context of the constraints and 
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opportunities opened up by the Asian Crisis and the failure of the Doha Round.  The 
discourses of ‘new institutional economics’, knowledge sharing, competitiveness, 
pro-poor and competition were translated it into practices that focus attention on and 
reinforce the status of competitiveness and competition policy as an object of 
governmentality, that create new competitive subjects, that steer it through new 
governmental technologies, and that assemble new dispositives. Based on 
discursive and technological selectivities, the ability of the President and Chief 
Economist of the World Bank to make a difference in this conjuncture indicates the 
importance of agential selectivity as well as the importance of their interpretive 
authority within the World Bank and Asian Development Bank as part of the leading 
Bretton Woods institution. These agents selectively rolled out their institutional and 
pro-poor reading of development and strategically promoted the discourses of 
knowledge bank, poverty reduction, competitiveness and competition. Reports and 
outlooks knitted together genres each of which had its own selectivity. The discursive 
selectivity of the World Bank-/Asian Development Bank-related genre chain 
expanded the meaning of competitiveness to include poverty reduction as both 
precondition and outcome but also limited the meaning of competition as a 
development tool best enhanced via competition policy/law. The density of this chain 
was further enhanced via knowledging technologies and apparatuses such as index, 
roundtable, toolkits, workshop, cost-benefit practices and technical assistance. 
Crucial here were the discursive and technological selectivities that allowed for the 
dispositivization of a regional socioeconomic-legal (dis-)order in Asia. One of its 
distinctive features was its use of competition as an economic development tool that 
emphasizes the need to get ‘competition policy/law right’ and links this to a 
purportedly pro-poor agenda. This aims to benefit the poor by boosting growth via 
effective competition policy and rests on the articulation of capital, development 
knowledge, and legal and managerial-professional practices that converge in a 
neoliberal direction. These discourses, institutions, technologies and practices 
contribute to the naturalization and reproduction of a new round of market 
reorganization that opens the domestic market for foreign capital in the name of 
reducing entry barriers, opening local monopolies to competition, and securing the 
benefits on the grounds that these measures would all boost competition and 




These post-Washing Consensus proposals are contested by several forces on the 
basis of their different positions in the circuits of capital as well as within the wider 
society. Regarding the former, while some groups seek to negotiate ‘exemptions’ for 
particular sectors or state-owned companies; others challenge whether 
competitiveness applies to firms, nations or regions and, if so, whether it depends on 
subordinating all social relations directly or indirectly to market forces in the name of 
creating a market-friendly environment and boosting development. This pro-poor 
rhetoric is essentially a pro-market ideology that conflates growth and poverty 
reduction and ignores the need for active social redistribution to compensate for 
market-generated polarization. The role of social forces and NGOs in challenging 
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Notes 
1 This does not mean that the real (social) world exists outside discourse: it means 
only that there it has objective features that exist and constrain action, whether or not 
specific subjects and discourses refer to them. To believe otherwise is to assert that 
the real world exists only to the extent that it is the subject of discourse. 
2 According to Fairclough (2003), genre chains are genres which are regularly and 
predictably chained together such that meanings are moved and transformed along 
the chain, and recontextualized and transformed in regular ways in accordance with 
recontextualizing principles (e.g., exclusion).   
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